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Abstract—Signal attenuation caused by the propagation path 
between the compromising emanation source (the location of 
secured IT equipment) and the location of the antenna of the 
potential infiltrating system has a direct influence on the 
electromagnetic safety of IT equipment. The article presents 
original analytical relationships necessary to estimate the 
attenuation values introduced by the propagation path of the 
potential compromising emanation signal, which correspond to the 
most probable locations of IT equipment in relation to the location 
of the potential infiltrating system. The author of the article 
analyzes various location scenarios for IT equipment – a potential 
source of compromising emanations – with a potential infiltrating 
system located either within or outside the boundaries of a 
building, in which said IT equipment is located. The 
aforementioned scenarios are characterized by the lowest 
propagation path attenuation of potential compromising 
emanation generated by the secured IT equipment and provide for 
location masking of the potential infiltrating system. Example 
design of protective solutions for IT equipment elaborated by 
article author in the form of a shielding enclosure is presented in 
the article as well. 
 
Keywords—IT equipment, EMC electromagnetic compatibility, 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
UE to the unbelievably fast development rate of modern 
technology in the recent years, and telecommunications 
technologies in particular, coupled with the introduction of 
computer technologies in virtually all facets of our lives, 
information became a critical resource, and is essential to 
success in both business and politics. As the vast majority of 
information is now processed using various types of IT 
equipment, safeguarding it from unauthorized access is more 
important than ever before. Emissions of electromagnetic 
disturbances unintentionally generated by IT equipment pose a 
high risk in this respect. Under favorable conditions, 
unauthorized parties may use this emitted interference to 
reproduce information processed by the equipment, in a process 
known as electromagnetic infiltration. Any electromagnetic 
emission, whose signal may be correlated with useful 
information, and can be used to reproduce said information, is 
called a compromising emission. Therefore, it is important to 
recognize and mitigate the risk of electromagnetic 
eavesdropping in IT equipment used for information processing. 
The article presents original analytical relationships necessary 
to estimate the attenuation values, introduced by the propagation 
path of the potential compromising emanation signal, for the 
most probable scenarios for the location of IT equipment in 
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relation to the location of the potential infiltrating system. The 
article analyses various location scenarios for secured IT 
equipment, constituting a potential source of compromising 
emanation, with the potential infiltrating system located both 
inside or outside the building housing said equipment. The 
aforementioned scenarios are characterized by the lowest 
propagation path attenuation of potential compromising 
emanation generated by the secured IT equipment and provide 
for location masking of the potential infiltrating system. 
The paper presents analytical relationships for calculating the 
attenuation value of the propagation path for a potential 
compromising emission signal Adr, introduced by the 
propagation path between the source of the compromising 
emission (the location of the secured IT equipment), and the 
location of the antenna of the potential infiltrating system, 
which has a direct impact on the electromagnetic safety of IT 
equipment. 
The article describes the protection of IT devices in the form 
of shielding housings against radiated compromising emissions. 
The article does not include the analysis of threats resulting from 
the possibility of penetration of conducted compromising 
emissions generated by IT devices to power lines. The above 
issue will be discussed in the next article covering the above 
subject. 
II. IMPACT OF IT EQUIPMENT LOCATION IN BUILDINGS ON ITS 
ELECTROMAGNETIC SECURITY 
The S/N ratio of the compromising emission signal level S 
and the level of environmental interference N at the receiver 
input of the potential infiltrating system is affected by several 
parameters. Primary parameters have been defined as 
components of the following analytical relationship, which 
determines the S/N ratio of the compromising emission signal 
level to the level of environmental interference at the input of 




= 𝐸𝐵,𝑚𝑎𝑥 + 𝐺𝑎 + 𝐺𝑟 − 𝐴𝑠 − 𝐴𝑑𝑟 − 𝐸𝑛,𝐵 − 𝐹𝑟 , (1) 
where: 
EB,max - allowed level of electric field strength for radiated 
emissions from IT equipment, as specified by standards 
harmonized with the electromagnetic compatibility 
directive [1], 
B - the IF filter width of the pass-through band of the 
measuring (infiltrating) receiver used during electric 
field strength measurements of emitted disturbances, 
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Ga - gain of the receiving antenna used for electromagnetic 
infiltration, 
Gr - signal processing gain of the compromising emission 
signal, 
As - shielding effectiveness of IT equipment enclosure, 
Adr - attenuation brought by the propagation of the signal 
between the compromising emission source and the 
infiltrating system, 
En,B - electric field strength of environmental interference, 
Fr - noise factor of the measuring (infiltrating) receiver. 
  
 
Fig. 1. The energy budget of the link between the secured IT equipment and the potential infiltrating system. 
 
The energy budget described in relation (1) is shown in 
Fig. 1. 
One of the components of the relationship is attenuation 
Adr brought by the propagation of the signal between the 
compromising emission source and the infiltrating system’s 
antenna. Upon performing the necessary transformations of the 
relationships (1) we obtain a relationship defining the value of 
Adr, which takes the form of 
 𝐴𝑑𝑟 = 𝐸𝐵,𝑚𝑎𝑥 + 𝐺𝑎 + 𝐺𝑟 −
𝑆
𝑁
− 𝐴𝑠 − 𝐸𝑛,𝐵 − 𝐹𝑟 . (2) 
In order to determine the relationship to the Adr, value, 
above which the ratio of the radiated compromising emission 
level to the environmental interference level S/N is smaller than 
or equal to 0 dB, a value of S/N = 0 dB must be inserted into the 
formula. 
 𝐴𝑑𝑟 = 𝐸𝐵,𝑚𝑎𝑥 + 𝐺𝑎 + 𝐺𝑟 − 𝐴𝑠 − 𝐸𝑛,𝐵 − 𝐹𝑟 . (3) 
Using the relationship above, it is possible to estimate the 
value of the Adr parameter, above which the ratio value of the 
S/N relationship is smaller than or equal to 0 dB at the input of 
the infiltrating receiver, which greatly hinders any attempts at 
electromagnetic infiltration. 
The attenuation value Adr, derived from the signal 
propagation path between the source of compromising 
emissions and the antenna of the infiltrating system, depends on 
the location of the secured IT equipment in relation to the 
location of the potential infiltrating system. In practice, in most 
common scenarios, associated with the greatest risk of 
electromagnetic infiltration, secured IT equipment is located 
inside the building (in an office environment), while the 
potential infiltrating system is masked and located near the 
secured IT equipment. Possible scenario configurations, which 
meet the above assumptions, include: 
− Scenario 1: IT equipment and the infiltrating system are 
located on the same floor of the building (Fig. 2), 
− Scenario 2: IT equipment is located inside the building, on 
its lowest floor, and is separated from the infiltrating system 
by a single external wall of the building (with the infiltrating 
system positioned outside of the building) (Fig. 2), 
− Scenario 3: IT equipment and infiltrating system are 
separated by a single internal partition, i.e. the floor or 
ceiling in a building (Fig. 2). 
A graphical representation of the aforementioned 
scenarios is represented on Fig. 2. It should be noted that the 
aforementioned scenarios are most common for hostile 
electromagnetic infiltration, as they ensure minimized 
attenuation Adr of the radiated compromising emission caused 
by the propagation path, and at the same time take into account 
the best masking locations for the infiltrating system. 
Considering that in the above scenarios, the IT equipment 
constituting a potential source of compromising emissions is 
most commonly found inside multi-storey office buildings, in 
order to determine the attenuation Adr, the author used a 
propagation model, which takes into account the specificity of 
electromagnetic wave propagation typical for this type of 
building. Technical literature [2][3][4] contains examples of 
many propagation models, which could be used to calculate 
propagation attenuation in an indoor environment. Of all 
available models, the propagation model recommended by the 
ITU-R document [2] was used due to the accuracy of the 
obtained calculations, and the simplicity they provide in the 
calculation of attenuation Adr brought by the propagation path 
of the compromising emission signal in an indoor environment. 
The propagation model recommended by ITU-R is an 
empirical model, which takes three factors into account, all of 
which have a decisive influence on the value of attenuation Adr 
determined by signal propagation path: 
− length of the propagation path dr, 
− frequency of propagating wave f, 
− attenuation of the signal passing through walls and ceilings 
of the building Afl. 
The first two components are included in most propagation 
models and their presence is natural. The last factor is related to 
the propagation specificity of a multi-storey building divided by 
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walls. Attenuation Adr brought by signal propagation path is 
determined by the following equation [2]: 
𝐴𝑑𝑟 = 20 ∙ 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑓) + 𝑁𝑙 ∙ 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑑𝑟) + 𝐴𝑓𝑙 ∙ (𝑓𝑙) − 28 , (4) 
where: 
f – frequency of propagating wave [MHz], 
dr  – length of the propagation path [m], 
Nl  – the distance attenuation factor, for which the 
recommended values are given in literature [2], 
Afl  – the ceiling attenuation factor, for which the 
recommended values are given in literature [2], 
fl  – the number of floors between IT equipment being a 




Fig. 2. Graphical representation of IT equipment and infiltrating system location scenarios. 
Due to the fact that the propagation model recommended 
by ITU-R is used solely to calculate the attenuation of 
propagation inside buildings in order to use the relationship (4) 
to calculate attenuation of the propagation path between the IT 
equipment and the infiltrating system located outside the 
building, it is necessary to additionally consider the attenuation 
Aw brought by the external (load-bearing) wall of the building. 
Recommended attenuation Aw values can be found in reference 
material [3]. Therefore, the general relationship of attenuation 
of the signal propagation path between the IT equipment being 
the source of the compromising emission signal and the 
infiltrating system takes the following form. 
𝐴𝑑𝑟 = 20 ∙ 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑓) + 𝑁𝑙 ∙ 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑑𝑟) + 𝐴𝑓𝑙 ∙ (𝑓𝑙) − 28 + 𝐴𝑤, (5) 
In order to calculate the lowest attenuation Adr values, 
which can be practically achieved in the electromagnetic 
infiltration process, brought by the propagation of the 
compromising emission signal, additional assumptions were 
made for all the aforementioned IT equipment location 
scenarios in relation to the location of the infiltrating system. 
The above assumptions and their justification are presented 
in Table I. In order to estimate the attenuation of Adr brought by 
the signal propagation path corresponding to Scenario 1 for the 
selected building parameters, in which the secured IT equipment 
was located, as a value of distance attenuation coefficient Nl, 
attenuation coefficient Afl and attenuation brought by the 
external (load-bearing) wall of the building Aw , which are part 
of the relationship (5), the following values taken from the 
literature position [2] and [3] were adopted: 
− Nl = 33 dB (f < 1GHz), Nl = 30 dB (1 GHz < f < 2 GHz), 
Nl = 25.5 dB (2 GHz < f < 3 GHz), 
Nl = 27 dB (3 GHz < f < 4 GHz), 
Nl = 28 dB (4 GHz < f < 5 GHz), 
Nl = 24 dB (5 GHz < f < 6 GHz)    , 
− Afl = 0.0 dB, 
− Aw = 0.0 dB. 
Obtained minimum values of Adr attenuation brought by 
signal propagation path for Scenario 1 are shown in Fig. 3 
(green curve). 
In order to estimate the attenuation of Adr brought by the 
signal propagation path corresponding to Scenario 2 for the 
selected building parameters, in which the secured IT equipment 
was located, as a value of distance attenuation coefficient Nl, 
attenuation coefficient Afl and attenuation brought by the 
external (load-bearing) wall of the building Aw , which are part 
of the relationship (5), the following values taken from the 
literature position [2] and [3] were adopted: 
− Nl = 33 dB (f < 1GHz), Nl = 30 dB (1 GHz < f < 2 GHz), 
Nl = 25.5 dB (2 GHz < f < 3 GHz), 
Nl = 27 dB (3 GHz < f < 4 GHz), 
Nl = 28 dB (4 GHz < f < 5 GHz), 
Nl = 24 dB (5 GHz < f < 6 GHz),  
− Afl = 0.0 dB, 
− Aw = 5.0 dB. 
Obtained minimum values of Adr attenuation brought by 
signal propagation path for Scenario 2 are shown in Fig. 3 (red 
curve). 
 





ASSUMPTIONS FOR INDIVIDUAL LOCATION SCENARIOS FOR THE IT EQUIPMENT  AND LOCATION OF AN INFILTRATING SYSTEM 
No. Assumption Assumption justification 
IT equipment location 
scenario 
No. 1 No. 2 No. 3 
1.  
The compromising emission 
signal is propagated inside an 
office building environment. 
This is typically the most common location 
for IT equipment being a potential source 
of compromising emission. 
x x x 
2.  
The IT equipment is located in an 
old office building (external walls 
of the building are made of light 
concrete, are 10 cm thick, and are 
furnished with single pane 
windows embedded in wooden 
frames). 
Old office buildings are characterized by 
the lowest attenuation Aw of the 
(load-bearing) external wall. 
– x – 
3.  
The distance between the systems 
is not less than 5 m. 
A distance of 5 m is the shortest practical 
distance possible between IT equipment 
and the infiltrating system, if such 
equipment is located on the same or on 
adjacent floors of a building. The shortest 
distance value ensures that the minimum 
Adr attenuation value of the propagation 
path of the compromising emission signal 
is achieved. 
The above distance also ensures that the 
location of the infiltrating system is 
masked.  




In order to estimate the attenuation of Adr brought by the 
signal propagation path corresponding to Scenario 3 for the 
selected building parameters, in which the secured IT equipment 
was located, as a value of distance attenuation coefficient Nl, 
attenuation coefficient Afl and attenuation brought by the 
external (load-bearing) wall of the building Aw , which are part 
of the relationship (5), the following values taken from the 
literature position [2] and [3] were adopted: 
− Nl = 33 dB (f < 1GHz), Nl = 30 dB (1 GHz < f < 2 GHz), 
Nl = 25.5 dB (2 GHz < f < 3 GHz), 
Nl = 27 dB (3 GHz < f < 4 GHz), 
Nl = 28 dB (4 GHz < f < 5 GHz), 
Nl = 24 dB (5 GHz < f < 6 GHz),  
− Afl = 9 dB (f < 1GHz), Afl = 15 dB (1 GHz < f < 2 GHz), 
Afl = 14 dB (2 GHz < f < 3 GHz), 
Afl = 18 dB (3 GHz < f < 4 GHz), 
Afl = 16 dB (4 GHz < f < 5 GHz), 
Afl = 22 dB (5 GHz < f < 6 GHz), 
− Aw = 0.0 dB. 
Obtained minimum attenuation Adr values brought by 
signal propagation path for Scenario 3 are shown in Fig. 3 (blue 
curve). 
The mathematical relationships presented in the article and 
the calculated attenuation Adr values presented in Fig. 3 relate to 
polarization of infiltrating antenna presented in Fig. 1 
(horizontal polarization). In order to calculate the attenuation 
Adr value for vertical polarization of infiltrating antenna we must 
use another value of antenna gain Ga in mathematical 
relationships presented in the article.
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Fig. 3. Attenuation Adr introduced by signal propagation path for particular scenarios of IT equipment location in relation to the location of the infiltrating system. 
 
III. PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS FOR SOLUTIONS PROTECTING IT 
EQUIPMENT AGAINST ELECTROMAGNETIC COMPROMISING 
EMANATIONS 
In practice, there are very often situations when the 
construction of buildings and rooms in which IT devices are 
used and the maximum possible propagation path attenuation 
Adr between IT devices and the potential location of the 
infiltration system do not ensure suppression of the 
compromising emission level to the value for which the 
compromising emanation signal level up to the level of 
environmental interference S/N < 0. In such cases, one of the 
possibilities of suppressing of the compromising emanation 
signal level is the use of shielding housings with the appropriate 
value of shielding efficiency As. The authors evaluated the 
required suitable values for parameters As, which would enable 
efficient shielding of IT equipment enclosures, and therefore 
reduce the risk of electromagnetic information emanations, as 
presented in reference [5].  
A number of shielding cabinets and enclosures integrated 
with protected IT equipment are available commercially. In 
articles [6][9][10], one can find examples of protective solutions 
for IT equipment in the form of a shielding enclosure, a 
shielding cabinet, and an enclosure integrated with the protected 
equipment and fitted with a power filter capable of satisfying 
requirements for shielding effectiveness As, as well  the 
requirements regarding  attenuation introduced by the power 
supply filters. Design solutions for protections presented therein 
were appropriated for use in scenarios with single and several 
items of IT equipment. 
The following is one of the possible solutions for the 
shielding enclosure for protection against compromising 
emanations from a single item of IT equipment. In order to 
protect a single item of IT equipment, such as a portable 
computer or a small-form-factor (SFF) CPU against 
electromagnetic emanation of compromising information, the 
shielding enclosure can be used built-in power supply filters and 
wires, which are used to supply power to the protected IT 
equipment and enable its communication with external 
accessories. In case of the shielding enclosure solution 
discussed herein, it is necessary to ensure that the PC being 
protected can communicate with the following peripherals: 
keyboard, mouse, monitor and 9 V DC and 12 V DC power 
supply. 
In order to satisfy the aforementioned requirements, the 
following components were installed within the enclosure: 
- power supply filters, 
- signal line filters. 
As the protected IT equipment emits a considerable volume 
of heat during operation, it must be cooled – in this case, by 
removing hot air out of the shielding enclosure. For this 
purpose, two 15 cm x 15 cm Tecknit ventilation panels were 
used. Cold air is sucked into the chamber through one of these 
panels, while the hot air evacuates out the chamber through the 
other. 
To facilitate installation of protected IT equipment, the 
chamber is fitted with removable doors with EMI gaskets, 
mounted using pins. The dimensions of the chamber allow for 
the installation of equipment, which is no larger than 
(15×35×55) cm in size. 
The main body of the shielding enclosure is made out 
galvanized steel sheets with a thickness of 1.5 mm. The sheet at 
the front is 5 mm thick, and made out of duralumin, with the 
transient panel made out of 2 mm thick brass. 
A block diagram of the shielding enclosure described herein 
can be found in Fig. 4. Dimensions of the chamber are presented 
in Fig. 5, and its external view is presented in Fig. 6. An 
example of how such a shielding chamber can be used is 
discussed and presented in the reference [7]. The shielding 
effectiveness of the shielding chamber described herein is 
presented as a diagram in Fig. 7. 
 
Fig. 4. Block diagram of the enclosure. 
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Fig. 6. External view of the front panel of the shielding enclosure. 
 
Fig. 7. Resulting As of the shielding enclosure. 
CONCLUSION 
Electromagnetic safety of IT equipment is affected by 
attenuation Adr brought in by the signal propagation path 
between the source of the compromising radiation and the  
 
antenna of infiltrating system. The article presents original 
analytical relationships necessary to estimate the attenuation 
value of the propagation path of the potential radiated 
compromising emanation signal, which corresponds to the most 
probable scenarios of locating IT equipment in relation to the 
location of the potential infiltrating system. The article analyzes 
various location scenarios for IT equipment – a potential source 
of compromising emanation – with a potential infiltrating 
system positioned within or outside the boundaries of a 
building, in which said IT equipment is located. It was 
determined that from the point of view of the location of a 
potential infiltrating system, the risk of infiltration, as measured 
by the value of attenuation brought by the propagation path of 
the emission signal is comparable for all analyzed scenarios. 
The paper presents an example design for a solution 
protecting against electromagnetic compromising emanations, 
namely a shielding enclosure equipped with required filtering 
hardware, which can fit a single item of IT equipment inside. 
The shielding enclosure as designed, with protected IT 
equipment being installed within, can be comfortably used in 
practice. The solution proposed does not require any 
interference in the internal design of the equipment being 
protected. The user of this solution needs only to install the 
equipment being protected inside the shielding enclosure. 
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